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Abstract
The question of cosmic beginning has always attracted considerable
attention from serious thinkers past and present. Among many contesting
theories that have emerged, that of emanation was appropriated by Muslim
philosophers like Ibn Sînâ in order to reconcile the Aristotelian doctrine of the
eternity of matter with the teaching of al-Qur’ân on the One Creator-God.
According to this theory, the universe, which comprises a multitude of  entities,
is generated from a transcendent Being, the One, that is unitary, through the
medium of  a hierarchy of  immaterial substances. While the ultimate source is
undiminished, the beings which are emanated are progressively less perfect as
they are further removed from the first principle. The process is conceived as
being atemporal and often compared to the efflux of light from a luminous
body, or to water flowing from a spring. This metaphysical theory has enabled
Ibn Sînâ to solve the vexed problem: given an eternally existing world and one
eternally existing God, how can the two necessarily co-exist without having the
perfect, simple unity of God destroyed by contact with the multiplicity of
material things? The following essay delineates and evaluates both Ibn Sînâ’s
arguments as well as the counter-arguments of  his critics.
Masalah permulaan kosmos selalu menarik perhatian para pemikir yang
serius di masa lalu dan masa kini. Di antara berbagai teori yang muncul adalah
teori emanasi yang telah dimodifikasi oleh filsuf Muslim seperti Ibn Sina untuk
menyesuaikan doktrin Aristoteles tentang keabadian materi dengan ajaran al-
Qur’an tentang Tuhan sebagai Pencipta Yang Esa. Menurut teori ini, alam, yang
terdiri dari berbagai entitas, diturunkan dari Wujud yang transenden, Yang Satu,
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yang Esa, melalui hirarki substansi material.  Sementara sumbernya tetap dan
tidak berkurang tingkatannya, wujud-wujud yang beremanasi secara progresif
menjadi kurang kesempurnaannya ketika semakin jauhnya dari prinsip pertama.
Proses ini dipahami sebagai tidak temporal dan seringkali dibandingkan dengan
pancaran cahaya dari benda yang bercahaya, atau seperti air yang mengalir dari
pancuran. Teori metafisika ini telah memungkinkan Ibn Sina menyelesaikan
problem yang rumit yaitu: bagaimana dua wujud yang pasti yaitu wujud alam
yang abadi dan wujud Tuhan yang juga abadi dapat berada secara bersamaan
tanpa merusak kesempurnaan dan keesaan Tuhan yang berhubungan dengan
keragaman benda-benda materi? Tulisan berikut ini membahas dan mengevaluasi
argumentasi Ibn Sina dan juga argumentasi yang mengkritiknya.
Keywords: Ibn Sina, emanation, cosmology, metaphysics, eternity,
origination
Preface
F
ew philosophers exercised as much and profound an influence
on medieval Islamic, Jewish and Christian thought as Ibn Sînâ
(d. 428/1037) or Avicenna as he was known in Latin.1 He
represents a development in philosophical thinking away from the
apologetic concerns for harmonizing religion with philosophy
towards an attempt to make philosophical sense of key religious
doctrines. In this article I shall present his metaphysical cosmology
and examine his views about the universe as an eternal, inevitable
emanation or ‘overflow’ of the Divine One, rather than as something
He created out of nothing. I shall discuss also the critical responses
to Ibn Sînâ’s views as put forward by subsequent thinkers, notably
al-Ghazâlî (d. 555/1111) and Fakhr al-Din al-Râzî (d. 606/1210).
The Problem of Beginning
Does the universe have a beginning? Is it created and originated
or not? Although Ibn Sînâ’s answer to these crucial questions turns
out to be in the negative, the full account and detailed arguments by
1On his biography and philosophical works, see W. Gohlman, The Life of lbn Sina
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1974); D. Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition (Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 1988); J. McGinnis, Avicenna (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
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which he corroborates his theses are by no means simple and
therefore deserve careful examination. Briefly stated, Ibn Sînâ’s
position on this issue is a kind of synthesis between two rival schemes.
The standard doctrine held by the majority of Muslim theologians
affirms (1) that the universe, by which is meant the physical world
of matter, does have a ‘beginning in time’—a definite moment in
the past at which it was originated or created; (2) that its creator is
one transcendent, eternal God; (3) that God’s act of creation is volun-
tary in the sense that it is neither necessitated nor due to His eternal
Essence; and (4) that God created it not from anything pre-existent
whatsoever, but ‘out of nothing’ (la min syay’), which also means
that its origination is preceded ‘in time’ by non-existence (‘adam).
The other theory, though affirming God’s existence, contends
that the universe, or rather the constituent matter underlying it, is
uncreated and that it has been there, eternally co-existing with God.
This is the view subscribed by most philosophers (falasifah), who
also deny God’s active role in the affairs of the world and construe
Him as nothing more than the First Cause, an automatically operating
force that keeps the spheres in motion and thereby sustains the world.
Ibn Sînâ’s strategy was to adopt and appropriate the supposedly
Aristotelian but actually Plotinian emanation scheme and fuse it with
the Aristotelian metaphysics of self-sufficiency, causal necessity, and
continuity of nature as well as with the Islamic monotheistic
conception of the urgent contingency and immediate dependence
of the world on God.
It is in a bid to reconcile those polarized opinions as well as in
a move to preserve the Qur’anic conception of God as the One that
Ibn Sînâ adopted and appropriated the theory of emanation in his
cosmology, viewing the universe as the necessary outflow or emission
from an eternal, necessitating cause, i.e. the ‘necessarily existent’ God,
while at the same time maintaining the metaphysical distinction
between essence and existence with respect to necessary and
contingent beings. This theory warrants Ibn Sînâ to allow the
emergence of multiple things in the universe from the One without
infringing in any way the simple oneness of that One, who is the
source of the being of all things that exist.
Thus, unlike the theologians who employ the terms khalq and
ih}dâts for creation and origination respectively, Ibn Sînâ distinguishes
the terms sun‘ (making), takwîn (forming or producing), and ibdâ‘
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(inventing), from îjâd (bringing into existence). And he reserves the
term fi‘l (acting) to describe Divine Agency, that is, the manner in
which God ‘effects’ the universe in the sense of causing it to exist, or
to be precise, necessitating its existence and sustaining it. It is in this
sense that Ibn Sînâ uses and understands the term “act”, as
distinguished from the ordinary usage. Thus he explains:
When we say, “He is the agent of the universe (fâ‘il al-kull)” we do not
mean that He is the one who bestowed existence upon everything
from scratch (jadîdan) which never before existed, as people commonly
understand by it. For such an understanding presumes the following
claims: either [1] this agent is called an agent insofar as existence
emanates from it, or [2] insofar as existence does not come out of it, or
[3] in both respects. Now if [it is an agent] insofar as existence issues
from it, without taking into account the [previous] not-being of that
existence, then [this is untenable because] the best agent should be
the one from which existence emanates eternally. As for the second
claim, it is obviously a contradiction. Finally, if it is an agent because
it bestowed existence upon that which [previously] did not exist and
at the same time does not give them existence, then it would avail
nothing [that is, it was useless since it did nothing] when they did
not yet exist. For non-existence does not require any cause, and even
necessitates no cause. Indeed, its actual function consists in the fact
that everything else receives its existence from it.2
Apart from fi‘l, material creation (takwîn), and temporal
origination (ih}dâts), there is, however, another plausible term which
in his view could also convey his metaphysical notion of creation,
namely the term ibdâ‘.3 But Ibn Sînâ immediately remarks that this
should not be taken as the masses understand it. For in popular
usage, the term ibdâ‘ simply means origination not from matter (al-
ikhtirâ‘ al-jadîd lâ ‘an mâddah), that is, creation out of nothing, whe-
reas according to the the philosophers, ibdâ‘ signifies the eternal enti-
fication of that which in itself is non-entity (idâmat ta’yîs mâ bi dhâtihi
lays), the process being eternal in the sense that the outcome or effect
depends on and is necessitated by the essence of the First alone.
For Ibn Sînâ, that creation or creative process must be eternal
follows from the fact that it depends on the essence of the First alone,
its true Efficient cause, rather than on matter, instrument, idea, or
any intermediary. The two terms thus differ in that whereas fi‘l
2 Al-Mabda’, 76.
3 Al-Isyârât: al-Ilâhiyyât, 95.
Divine Emanation as Cosmic Origin... 335
Vol. 8, No. 2, Oktober 2012
denotes the bestowal of existence and removal of non-existence at
one time but not continuously, the term ibdâ‘ however means the
same act (of giving and depriving existence) but with lasting effects.4
Only in this sense can the term ibdâ‘ be substituted for the term fi‘l.
As can be seen, already in his terminology Ibn Sînâ indicates his
preference for emanative creation over the well-received opinion that
the universe was originated out of nothing.
Existence as Divine Overflow
As far as Ibn Sînâ’s doctrine of emanative creation is concerned,
one could easily discern that the theory is grounded on a presupposed
premise derived from Revelation and philosophy which states that
God is a unique and absolutely simple Being.5 Thus he maintains
that the effect of God’s creative activity has to be consistent with His
‘unique’ nature (that is, His absolute oneness), so that the effect too
would have to be numerically one and substantially simple, and hence
his famous formula: “from one thing only one thing could proceed
(al-wâhid min haytsu huwa wâhid innamâ yûjad ‘anhu wâhid).”6
However, since the universe is plainly composed and consists
of innumerable things, it could hardly be supposed to have proceeded
from God directly. Therefore, Ibn Sînâ contends, the only plausible
explanation for the universe deriving its multiplicity from a single
cause is to envisage a continuous series of individuals of various kinds
proceeding from other causally prior entities, which serve as inter-
mediaries between the First (al-Awwal) and the universe.7 In Ibn
Sînâ’s view, the increasing scope and complexity of these intermediary
causes and effects, ranging from the immaterial ‘first intelligence’ to
the lowest of material things, would eventually account not only for
the tremendous diversity of the world-system, but also for its causal
origin and dependence upon God. Thus God is seen as the agent or
4 Al-Mabda’, 77.
5 The Qur’ân 112:1, “Qul huwa Allâh ahad”; id. 37:4, “Inna ilâhakum lawâhid.”
6Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, 405; al-Isyârât: al-Ilâhiyyât, 216-7. On this wonderful formula
see Mokdad A. Mensia, Essai sur le principe «de L’un ne procède que de l’un» dans la philosophie
islamique (Thèse 3ème cycle; Paris, 1977) and Alain de Libera, “Ex uno non fit nisi unum. La
lettre sur le principe de l’univers et les condamnations parisiennes de 1277,” in Historia
philosophiae medii aevii. [Festschrift für Kurt Flasch zu seinem 60. Geburtstag], ed. Burkhard
Mojsisch and Olaf Pluta, 2 vols. (Amsterdam and Philadelphia, 1991), 1: 543-60.
7 Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, 405.
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efficient cause (al-‘illah al-fâ‘iliyyah) of the universe and the latter
as the expression of His act.
Ibn Sînâ uses several terms to describe emanation, namely:
s }udûr (procession), fayd} (overflow), and luzûm (necessary consequen-
ce).8 His choice of these terms reflects at least two assumptions,
namely, his view that (1) the actuality of every contingent being
represents the existential plenitude and activity of that from which
it emanates, and that (2) such actualization is necessarily outgoing
and self-revealing in the sense that the act not only belongs to it but
also extends outward from it.
Consequently, the procession of causes and effects will be conti-
nuous with its ultimate source in both a temporal and an ontological
sense; temporally, it will be co-existent with God’s creative activity,
and ontologically, the causal series will remain inseparable from God
simply because it is a necessary overflow of Himself.9 This is part of
the reason why Ibn Sînâ holds that the eternity of God’s existence
necessitates a co-eternal universe which is the collective embodiment
of the emanation, and this is why for him the universe (al-kull)—that
is, the totality of things constituting the physical world, though not
identical with God, is somehow a projection out of Divine Plenitude.
According to Ibn Sînâ, it is from the Necessary Being, namely
God, which is described as Pure Intelligence (‘aql mahd) and the
First Principle (al-mabda’ al-awwal) that all other beings derive their
existence, not directly but through intermediary (bi wâsitah). He
insists, however, that we must not suppose that the universe comes
into existence because God intended so (‘alâ sabîl qas}d minhu), for
then He would act for something lower than Himself and introduce
multiplicity (takatstsur) within His divine essence. Nor can it be the
case that the universe comes into existence naturally by itself (‘alâ
sabîl al-t}ab‘) in the sense that He is not aware of its genesis and does
not mean it (lâ bi ma‘rifah wa lâ rid }â minhu).10
Indeed, God was and always is completely cognizant of both
the universe (which is His effect) and the goodness emanating from
Him—a fact which not only reflects His perfection but also manifests
part of the necessary consequences of His majestic nature to which
8 Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, 402-3.
9 Al-Najât, 311.
10 Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, 402; al-Mabda’, 75 and 78-9.
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every being yearns to return. It is by virtue of His act of self-reflection
that the universe comes into existence (ta‘aqquluhu ‘illah li’l-wujûd)
as a necessary consequence of His own Existence. Even so, Ibn Sînâ
remarks, each of the issuing effects, including the universe is by no
means identical (mubâyinan) with Him.11
Now, the First Principle is designated as Necessary Being (wâjib
al-wujûd) in a double sense: not only does He exist necessarily, but
He must act necessarily as well, and His act is an act of self-reflection.
It is through His contemplation of His own essence (ya‘qil dhâtahu)
that the first effect (al-ma‘lûl al-awwal), which is also said to be a
pure, immaterial intelligence, necessarily proceeds. Since multiplicity
(kathrah) is inconceivable in Him, the effect must be single (wâh}id
bi’l-‘adad), for as a rule, from one simple thing, only one can proceed.12
However, this formula breaks down in subsequent emanations.
For as Ibn Sînâ tells us, within the first intelligence (al-‘aql al-awwal)
lies the germ of multiplicity, since its thought involves three acts of
reflection, namely: (1) recognition of God’s necessary existence, (2)
consciousness of its own causally necessitated existence, and (3) awa-
reness of its own existence as in itself only possible.13 Consequently,
the first act gives rise to another intelligence, the second act produces
a celestial soul of the outmost sphere (nafs al-falak al-aqs}â), whereas
the third act generates the body (jirm) of this same sphere. Then the
second intelligence, in a similar fashion, gives rise to a third
intelligence, to the soul of the second sphere of the fixed stars, and
to the body of that sphere. From the third intelligence there likewise
emanates another triad, namely, a fourth intelligence, the soul of the
third sphere, and the body of the third sphere.
This emanation of intelligences, we are told, goes on
successively, each giving rise to successive triads and is halted only
with the production of the sphere of the moon and the tenth or last
intelligence, otherwise called the Agent Intellect (al-‘aql al-fa‘‘âl) from
which our material world of generation and corruption originated.
This Active Intelligence, instead of begetting the soul and body of a
sphere, begets human souls and the four elements, i.e. water, air,
fire, and earth.14
11 Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, 403; al-Mabda’, 75-6.
12 Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, 404.
13 Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, 405; al-Najât, 313; al-Mabda’, 79.
14 Al-Najât, 313-4.
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As noted earlier, Ibn Sînâ conceives the universe as consisting
of nine concentric spheres (aflâk) with their corresponding souls
(nufûs samâwiyyah) and bodies (ajrâm ‘ulwiyyah), in addition to the
ten intelligences (‘uqûl).15 In ascending order of the spheres he places,
like Ptolemy did, the moon, Mercury, Venus, sun, Mars, Jupiter,
and Saturn—called the ‘wandering stars’ or planets (al-kawâkib al-
mutahayyirah), whereas the Fixed Stars (al-tsawâbit) and another
yet unnamed celestial body are said to be attached to the second and
the first, outermost sphere respectively.16
Thus each planetary celestial body is believed to have only a
single sphere (falak) or orb (kurah)17 to which it is attached and by
which it is carried around at various distances from the earth. In Ibn
Sînian cosmic system, each intelligence, being the teleological cause
in every emanative triad, becomes the target of desire (syawq; ‘isyq)
for the celestial soul within the triad, causing the eternal circular
motion of the third component of the triad, the celestial body. And
given the eternal motion of the celestial spheres, Ibn Sînâ thus
postulates that the emanative process too must be eternal in the sense
that God, the eternal efficient cause, ever in act, necessitates the
existence of an eternal effect, the universe.18
One might curiously ask, however, why the process stops at
the tenth, so-called Active Intelligence and does not go on ad infinitum.
To this Ibn Sînâ replies: while it is true that the necessary procession
of multiplicity of beings from one intelligence implies  plurality of
aspects (ma‘ânî) in it, the reverse is not. That is to say, it would be
wrong to assume that plurality of aspects always implies the necessary
procession of multiplicity of beings. Nor is it true that every intelli-
15 Ibid., 313-4.
16 Al-Syifâ: al-Riyâd }iyyât: ‘Ilm al-Hay’ah, ed. M. Ridâ Mudawwar and I. Ibrâhîm
Ahmad (Cairo, 1980), 463. Cf. Ptolemy, The Almagest, trans. R. C. Taliaferro, in the Great
Books of the Western World, vol. 16 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1952), 270 (bk.
9, chap. 1).
17 These two terms are used by Ibn Sînâ indiscriminately, besides the equally common
one: dâ’irah. But according to al-Bîrûnî (d. 1048), “dâ’irah and falak are two terms that
denote the same thing and are interchangeable. However, sometimes falak refers to the
globe (kurah), particularly when it is moveable (mutaharrik) and therefore falak does not
apply to the motionless. It is called falak only on account of its similarity with the whorl of
the rotating spindle (‘alâ wajh al-tasybîh bi falakat al-mighzal al-dâ’ir).” See his al-Qânûn al-
Mas‘ûdî (Hyderabad: Osmania Oriental Publications Bureau, 1954), 54-5.
18 Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, 407.
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gence having the same kind of aspects will produce the same kind
of effects.19
What Ibn Sînâ seemingly wishes to say is that the outcome
depends on the nature and power of each emanative intelligence;
and as intelligences succeed one another, their power decreases, and
since the Active Intelligence stands low in the hierarchy its power is
no longer sufficient to produce eternal beings like those emanated
by the intelligences above it. Nevertheless, Ibn Sînâ ascribes to the
Active Intelligence a set of functions that lend his scheme a balance
missing in that of al-Fârâbî, who assigns the Active Intelligence
functions related solely to the actualization of the human mind.20 By
contrast, in Ibn Sînâ’s scheme, the Active Intelligence, being the
emanative cause of matter of our sublunar world (‘aql al-âlam al-
ardî),21 is not only responsible for bestowing the earthly beings their
natural ‘forms’ (i.e. their souls) but also in charge of (yudabbiru) the
souls of humans, animals and plants.22
Furthermore, the Active Intelligence is also described by Ibn
Sînâ as the cause of the actualization of human minds (al-jawhar al-
mukmil li anfus al-nâs)23 as well as the source of their intuitive
knowledge.24 No wonder then the Active Intelligence is often called
the Giver of Forms (wâhib al-suwar)25 and sometimes also identified
as the Archangel Gabriel (rûh al-quds) or the Angel of Revelation (al-
rûh al-amîn).26
Criticism and Response
Ibn Sînâ’s emanation scheme has stirred up debates and evoked
polemical reaction. I shall review some of the arguments advanced
by its prominent critics, notably al-Ghazâlî (d. 1111) and Fakhr al-
Dîn al-Râzî (d. 1210). Al-Ghazâlî raises five objections (i‘tirâd}ât) to
19 Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, 407; al-Mabda’, 80.
20 See Al-Fârâbî, al-Madînah al-Fadîlah, ed. and trans. R. Walzer, Al-Fârâbî on the
Perfect State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 100-105.
21 Al-Najât, 310.
22 Al-Najât, 314; al-Shifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, 410; al-Mabda’, 80.
23 Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, 388.
24 Al-Syifâ’: al-Tabî’iyyât: al-Nafs, 208.
25 Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, 413; al-Syifâ’: al-Tabî’iyyât: al-Nafs, 218
26 See Al-Fârâbî, Kitâb al-Siyâsah al-Madaniyyah, ed. with intro. and notes by Fawzi
M. Najjâr, 2nd imp. (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1993), 32.
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Ibn Sînâ‘s theory of emanation.27 First, he questions whether the
‘being-possible’ of the first effect, whose existence is said to be
possible, is identical with its existence (‘ayn wujûdihi) or not. If
identical, then there is no plurality; but if different, then the being-
necessary-in-itself of God’s existence too must be other than His
existence—a logical conclusion Ibn Sînâ would not allow because it
implies plurality in the One.
This objection, however, might just as well be dismissed since
al-Ghazâlî has, in the first place, seen no harm in affirming the
presence of multiplicity in God, in accordance with the Ash‘arite
doctrine of God’s various Names and Attributes.28 Moreover, this
criticism in fact stems from his outright rejection of the most
fundamental thesis in Ibn Sînâ’s metaphysics, that God’s existence is
necessary in itself. For al-Ghazâlî, to affirm the existence of God and
deny the necessity of such an existence at the same time does not at
all involve contradiction because God, being transcendent and
unknowable, is beyond such human-invented concept.29
Both the second and third objections are likewise theological
and even begging the question, arguing that God’s knowledge involves
the idea of multiplicity and so does His thought, which is precisely
the point at issue. The fourth charge contends that the first effect,
being a pure intelligence, is insufficient to produce something com-
posed of form (soul) and matter (body), a particular size, axis, etc.,
like a celestial body. Finally al-Ghazâlî claims that he finds no convin-
cing arguments offered by Ibn Sînâ that prove his assertion that
27 See al-Ghazâlî, Tahâfut, 100-9. Cf. Michael E. Marmura, “The Conflict over the
World’s Pre-eternity in the Tahâfuts of al-Ghazâlî and Ibn Rushd,” (Ph.D diss., University of
Michigan, 1959), 20-4. Other critics include al-Shahrastânî, Musâra‘at al-Falâsifah, ed. S.
M. Mukhtâr (Cairo, 1976), 59-60 and 86-88, as well as Ibn Taymiyyah, Minhâj al-Sunnah al-
Nabawiyyah fî Naqd Kalâm al-Syî‘ah wa al-Qadariyyah, 4 vols. (Cairo: al-Matba‘ah al-
Amîriyyah, 1321 A.H.), 1: 89 and 1: 94-6.
28 The Ash‘arites maintain that God’s Attributes exist in Him as eternal, separate
immaterial entities, in contrast to the Mu‘tazilites who hold that the doctrine of tawhîd
necessitates that no entity exists in His Essence and there is a kind of identity between God
and His Attributes. See ‘Abd al-Qâhir al-Baghdâdî (d. 429 AH/ 1037 CE), Kitâb Usûl al-Dîn,
1st imp. (Istanbul: Matba‘at al-Dawlah, 1928), 90 and 109, and al-Shahrastânî, Nihâyat al-
Iqdâm, 204 in which he argues against the philosophers that even the notion of Necessary
Being admits of duality, i.e. necessity and existence, so that if they (the falâsifah) can accept
it, why then not the Attributes? For further discussion, see Michel Allard, Le problème des
attributs divins dans la doctrine d’al-Aš‘arî et de ses premiers grands disciples (Beirut: Imprimerie
Catholique, 1965).
29 See Tahâfut, 143-4; S. Dunyâ’s ed.: 173-5 and 181.
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emanation is a necessary process.
For al-Ghazâlî, the whole account is simply absurd. Again, this
objection rests on al-Ghazâlî’s conception of God as a voluntary agent
who can create plurality and diversity as He wishes and wills (yakhluq
al-mukhtalifât wa al-mutajânisât kamâ yurîd wa ‘alâ mâ yurîd).30 But
what Ibn Sînâ seeks, in contrast with al-Ghazâlî’s appeal to Revelation,
is a properly rational explanation that would fit well into his grand
metaphysical system. Seen in this perspective, any criticism leveled
against Ibn Sînâ’s theory would count only if, the basic premises
having been admitted, it succeeds to expose the internal logical
inconsistencies that would bring down his system.
Interesting to note in this regard is Ibn Rushd’s observation
of a fundamental error committed by emanationist philosophers like
al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ. According to the Andalusian philosopher, by
affirming the ex uno non fit nisi unum principle and then assuming
multiplicity in the first entity that proceeds, the philosophers are
forced to regard this multiplicity as uncaused,31 a consequence which
merely shows inconsistency in their use of the principle.
In order to resolve this apparent contradiction, however, one
needs only to recall the fact that Ibn Sînâ, true to his strict monism,
cannot allow more than one effect to proceed from the One precisely
because His active intellection, reflection or contemplation (ta‘aqqul)
has been and is focussed purely and only on Himself, for in the
beginning “only He and nothing else was,”32 so that only one single
effect could emanate. The same rule would have definitely applied if
we encounter a similar situation in the next process, which is not the
case. For the first intelligence, as Ibn Sînâ put it, is naturally conscious
of its own self, cognizant of its Cause, and aware of the fact that its
existence, considered in itself, is merely possible. It is these seeds of
plurality existing in the first and subsequent intelligences which
nullify the monistic principle when it comes to the nine succeeding
emanations.
30 Tahâfut, 109.
31 Tahâfut al-Tahâfut, 249-50.
32 A well-known tradition: “kâna Allâh wa lam yakun shay’ ma‘ahu,” related by al-
Bukhârî, al-Jâmi‘ al-Sahîh (Beirut: Dâr al-Fikr, n.d.), 4: 129. Cf. “Kâna Allâh wa lâ shay’
ma‘ahu,” reported by al-Zabîdî, Ithâf al-Sâdah al-Muttaqîn, 2: 105 and “kâna Allâh wa lam
yakun shay’ ghayruhu,” narrated by al-Bayhaqî, al-Sunan al-Kubrâ, 9: 3 and al-Tabarânî, al-
Mu‘jam al-Kabîr, 18: 205.
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Turning now to al-Râzî’s objections (syukûk), we shall
summarize and consider only the following point.33 Generally, he
complains of the ambiguity in Ibn Sînâ’s statement about the
emergence of plurality from the first effect; is it due to the possibility
of its reflection of its own existence (imkân ta‘aqquli wujûdih) or, as
noted earlier, is it because of its very reflection of its own possibility
(ta‘aqqul imkâni nafsih), etc? Al-Râzî indeed refutes both possible
readings.34 Specifically, he questions whether in Ibn Sînâ’s scheme a
second intelligence and a celestial body emanated from the first
intelligence because of the latter’s being-possible in itself, or because
of its being-necessary from another and its knowledge of its Cause.
Both alternatives, he contends, are untenable. For neither possibility,
nor necessity-by-virtue-of-another, nor existence can serve as a
cause.35 Al-Râzî adduces several logical proofs in support of his view
that they cannot be causes. In the case of possibility, for instance, he
argues that whatever is non-existent in the external world (e.g. a
possible entity) cannot be the cause of something that does exist
externally (e.g. a celestial body).36
Having proved that possibility is not an existential entity (amr
wujûdî) and therefore cannot be the cause of anything existent,37 al-
Râzî then takes up each of the other attributes of the first intelligence,
namely its possible existence, its necessity, its self-knowledge and its
knowledge of its Cause, showing that none of them is sufficient to
serve as a cause.38 It is clear that most if not all arguments put forth
by al-Râzî purport to overthrow the fundamental emanationist thesis
that from a one thing only one can proceed.39
A sophisticated reply to al-Râzî’s criticisms has come from
Nasîr al-Dîn al-Tûsî (d. 1273 CE), who carefully explains two major
33 For more discussion, see Nicholas Heer, “Al-Râzî and al-Tûsî on Ibn Sînâ’s Theory
of Emanation,” in Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought, ed. Parvez Morewedge (Albany:
SUNY Press, 1992), 115-8.
34 Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzî, al-Mabâhits al-Masyriqiyyah, 2 vols. (Qumm: Matba‘at Amîr,
1991), 2: 503.
35 See his commentary in Kitâb Syarhay al-Isyârât, printed on the margins, 2 vols.
(Cairo: n.p., 1907), 2: 48 lines 20-3; cf. ibid., 2: 49 line 12ff.
36 Ibid., 2: 49. Cf. Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzî, Lubâb al-Isyârât, printed as in Ibn Sînâ, al-
Tanbîhât wa al-Isyârat [sic!], ed. Mahmûd Shahâbî (Tehran: Tehran University Press, n.d.),
267-8.
37 Syarhay al-Isyârât, 2: 48 lines 23-36.
38 Mabâhits, 2: 503-5.
39 Lubâb, 268.
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problems in Ibn Sînâ’s theory, that is, the issue of multiplicity in the
first intelligence, and the question of exactly which aspects within
the first intelligence are the causes of which effects.40 The first
intelligence, says al-û‚sî, has a total of six aspects (haytsiyyât), of which
two are its constituent parts (muqawwimât) namely its existence and
quiddity, and the other four are its concomitants (lawâzim), which
include its possibility in itself, its necessity through its Principle, its
self-knowledge, and its knowledge of its Principle.41 This is so because
on Ibn Sînâ’s account it is impossible for the first intelligence, which
is a caused entity, to be composed of various things (muqawwaman
min mukhtalifât).42
But more importantly, al-Tûsî does not equate the first effect
with the first intelligence. For him, the first effect to emanate from
God was existence (wujûd), which he construes as merely an aspect
or, to be precise, one of the two constituents of the first intelligence.43
This is because, according to al-Tûsî, the term al-ma‘lûl al-awwal is
used equivocally, sometimes it designates the simple existence and
at other times it refers to the composite first intelligence.44 Coming
to the second problem, he asserts that quiddity and possibility, which
are considered to be non-existential (‘adamiyyayn) in themselves and
existential only ab alio, and which represent the state of the first
intelligence in its potentiality, are responsible for the matter (body)
of the celestial sphere. In contrast, existence and self-knowledge,
which represent its state in actuality, are responsible for the form
(soul) of the sphere.45 It is the last two aspects, namely, necessity and
knowledge of the First Principle, which represent the state of the
first intelligence insofar as it is derived from God, that are responsible
for the emanation of another intelligence. Al-Tûsî concedes that none
of these aspects is existential entity and therefore cannot be
independent causes in themselves. But they do serve, he insists, as
conditions (syurût) and modes (h }aytsiyyât) through which the true
Efficient Cause acts and creates.46
40 Cf. N. Heer, “Al-Râzî and al-Tûsî on Ibn Sînâ’s Theory of Emanation,” in Neoplatonism
and Islamic Thought, 119-23.
41 See his commentary in al-Isyârât: al-Ilâhiyyât, 219 and 221.
42 Comment in al-Isyârât: al-Ilâhiyyât, 223.
43 Comment in al-Isyârât: al-Ilâhiyyât, 218.
44 Comment in al-Isyârât: al-Ilâhiyyât, 226.
45 Comment in al-Isyârât: al-Ilâhiyyât, 223-4.
46 Comment in al-Isyârât: al-Ilâhiyyât, 225.
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The emanation theory has also led some people to charge
Ibn Sînâ with pantheism. They argue that to regard the universe
and everything there as an emanation from the One is to blur the
distinction between the Creator and creatures. This criticism,
however, happily ignores the clear statement made by Ibn Sînâ that
“He is the Existent from which each and every existence emanates;
His Existence is Essential and distinct (mubâyin) from every other
existence.”47
True, there is a big difference between creating from nothing
and producing from one’s thought. In the latter case, as Morewedge
points out, a resemblance is implied between the source and its
outcome.48 But as a matter of fact, Ibn Sînâ does postulate a Being
utterly transcendent with respect to all other beings, in spite of his
adherence to emanationism when it comes to the question of creation.
In his scheme, as indicated earlier, the gulf separating the
transcendent God and eternally emanated hierarchy of beings is
bridged by the First Intelligence, which in one text is identified with
the first Archangel-Cherub.49 Another guarantee against any danger
of pantheistic interpretation is to be found in Ibn Sînâ’s famous if
not enigmatic doctrine of essence and existence.50
Conclusion
To sum up, the theory of emanation was meant to supplement
the meagre and Islamically unacceptable view formulated by Aristotle
to whom there was no passage from God, the One, to the world, the
many. The theory was apparently intended less as an account of the
origin of the universe than a description, in temporal imagery, of the
eternal relation of the world to God. For in Ibn Sînâ’s view there is
47 Al-Mabda’, 76. Cf. Al-Syifâ’: al-Ilâhiyyât, 403.
48P. Morewedge, The Metaphysica of Avicenna (ibn Sînâ). A Critical Translation-
Commentary and Analysis of the Fundamental Arguments in Avicenna’s Metaphysica in the
Dânish Nâma-i ‘alâ’î (The Book of Scientific Knowledge), Persian Heritage Series, no. 13
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 272.
49 Henry Corbin, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital (Dallas: Springs Publications,
1980), 58.
50 This subject has been discussed by Fazlur Rahman, “Essence and Existence in
Avicenna,” Medieval and Renaissance Studies 4 (1958): 1-16; id., “Essence and Existence in
Avicenna: Myth and Reality,” Hamdard Islamicus 4 (1981): 3-14; and P. Morewedge,
“Philosophical Analysis and Ibn Sînâ’s Essence-Existence Distinction,” Journal of the American
Oriental Society (JAOS) 92 (1972): 425-35.
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no absolute beginning of a finite being here since, according to him,
a beginning refers not to just one now of time, but to every time and
age.51 It is impossible, he says, that a thing begins to be after it was
not, since [prime] matter would precede it from which it would begin
to be.52 And like al-Fârâbî, he was trying to reconcile the Aristotelian
doctrine of the eternity of matter with the teaching of al-Qur’ân on
the One Creator-God.
Indeed, Ibn Sînâ’s emanation theory represents an attempt to
solve this vexed problem: given an eternally existing world and one
eternally existing God, how can the two necessarily co-exist without
having the perfect, simple unity of God destroyed by contact with
the multiplicity of material things? Ibn Sînâ’s answer was to interpose
many levels of spiritual substances, namely, the intelligences, between
God and matter as a shield to safeguard and maintain the divine
Oneness from multiplicity. In other words, although God remains
in Himself and high above transcending the created world, there
are, nevertheless, intermediary links between the absolute eternity
and necessity of God and the world of downright contingency. Thus
by relating the spiritual intelligences to God as the necessarily acting
Source of their beings, Ibn Sînâ is able to account both for the
necessity of their being and for their indebtedness to God as their
Efficient Cause.[]
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